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Abstract
This note studies the empirical content of a simple marriage matching model with trans-
ferable utility, based on Becker (1973). Under Becker’s conditions, the equilibrium matching
is unique and assortative. However, this note shows that, when the researcher only observes a
subset of relevant characteristics, the unique assortative matching does not uniquely determine a
distribution of observed characteristics. This precludes standard approaches to point estimation
of the underlying model parameters. We propose a solution to this problem, based on the idea
of “random matching”.
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1 An empirical model based on Becker (1973)
In this note, we investigate the problem of doing empirical analysis on the classical two-sided
marriage matching model of Becker (1973). We add to the Beckerian model the unobserved het-
erogeneity in the form of unobserved characteristics, as is reasonable in empirical applications.
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Consider a setting where each man (woman) is characterized by X˜ ≡ (X, ) (Y˜ ≡ (Y, η)), where
X and Y are observables and  and η are unobservables. Furthermore each man’s unobserved
component  (resp. woman’s η) is drawn from the distribution F(·, β) (resp. Fη(·, βη)), which
is known up to the finite-dimensional parameters β (βη). The characteristics are independently
drawn across individuals.
Consider a transferable utility two-sided matching market, and let S(X, , Y, η) denote the total
surplus function that a man with characteristics (X, ) and a woman with characteristics (Y, η)
obtain from being matched.1
Assumption 1. (a) X˜ ∼ FX,ε, and Y˜ ∼ FY,η,
(b) each agent’s observed and unobserved characteristics affect the surplus function via a single-
index; that is to say, S(X, , Y, η, βS) = S(f(X, , βS), g(Y, η, βS)), for scalar-valued known map-
pings f(·) and g(·) and a parameter βS;2 and
(c) S(u, v) is super-modular in the indices u and v.
In what follows, we will refer to U := f(X, , βS) and V := g(Y, η, βS) as the quality indices of
men and women, and denote generic values of these elements by u and v, respectively. We also let
θ = (β′, β′η, β′S)
′ and let Θ be the space of θ under consideration. β (or βη) may contain parameters
describing how X and  (or Y and η) are correlated.
Equilibrium assortative matching. Becker (1973) shows that the single index assumption
and super-modularity imply matching that is associative in the indices. Specifically, for fixed values
of θ, the joint distributions FX,(·;β) and FY,η(·;βη) imply unique marginal distributions for the
quality indices U and V , which are denoted as
FU (u;β, βS) and FV (v;βη, βS). (1)
And the single index super-modularity assumption (Assumption 1) implies assortative matching:
Proposition 1 (Single Index Assortative Matching Rule). Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then,
a man with U = u is matched with a woman with V = F−1V (τ ;βη, βS) where τ = FU (u;β, βS).
1The assumptions are similar to those of the transferable utility model studied in Chiappori et. al. (2012),
although we do not assume that X and  (Y and η) are separable in the single index functions.
2In Becker’s original formulation, these single-indices are interpreted as the time inputs that a husband or wife
contributes towards household production. See also Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
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The proposition is implied by the arguments in Section 1 of the Appendix of Becker (1973).
In this note, we investigate the empirical implication of this theoretical result. Specifically,
we consider the empirical situation where one observes the joint distribution of the observable
characteristics FX,Y of married couples in the data and would like to learn about θ based on FX,Y .
That is, we investigate the possibility of forming an empirical model for the observed data on
(X,Y ), based on Becker’s (1973) theoretical result.
Related literature. Our work is related to the large and growing empirical literature on
the identification and structural estimation of two-sided matching models, including Choo and
Siow (2006), Fox (2010), Uetake and Watanabe (2012), Menzel (2013), Echenique, Lee, Shum, and
Yenmez (2013), Graham (2013), and Galichon and Salanie´ (2015).
Particularly, the papers of Choo and Siow (2006) and Galichon and Salanie´ (2015) estimate
transferable utility two-sided matching models for the marriage market, also under the assump-
tion that men and women have both observed and unobserved heterogeneity. However, in those
papers, the uniqueness of the equilibrium matching directly implies uniqueness of the joint dis-
tribution of observed characteristics (X,Y ) among married couples. There are two important
differences between their setting and ours. First, the unobserved heterogeneity in their model is
better characterized as preference heterogeneity, as it allows (say) two different men to obtain differ-
ent contributions to surplus from the same woman. In our model, unobserved heterogeneity takes
the form of unobserved characteristics, so that a woman with characteristics (Y, η) contributes the
same surplus (= g(Y, η)) to all potential partners. Second, the models of Choo-Siow and Galichon-
Salanie´ are not single-index models, but rather multidimensional models, so that the equilibrium
matching is not assortative (indeed, in the multidimensional setting, it is not even clear what the
notion of “assortative” means). Our model, in contrast, is a unidimensional model (ie. both men
and women’s contributions to surplus can be summarized by a single scalar index) so that assor-
tativeness (in surplus indices) is well-defined. Thus, our analysis shows how the assumption of
assortative matching can have limited empirical implications.
2 Indeterminancy of the matching model
Now we show that even under the strong assumptions guaranteeing assortative matching, the
equilibrium distribution of the observed covariates X,Y is not uniquely determined. This precludes
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standard point estimation approaches for the structural model parameter θ.
Theorem 1. (a) Assumption 1 does not imply a unique joint distribution of X and Y in married
couples: F ∗X,Y (x, y, θ), for each θ ∈ Θ.
(b) This nonuniqueness persists even if we further assume that FX, and FY,η are continuous
distributions (w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure).
Proof. (a) We prove part (a) by giving a very simple counter example where X, ε, Y, η are indepen-
dent Bernoulli(0.5) and the index functions are additive:
U := X +  and V := Y + η.
For a supermodular surplus function S(U, V ), the optimal assortative matching is characterized by:
(X, ) ⇐⇒ (Y, η) : (2)
(1, 1)⇐⇒ (1, 1)
(1, 0)
(0, 1)
⇐⇒
 (1, 0)(0, 1)
(0, 0)⇐⇒ (0, 0)
In an optimal match, any woman with characteristics (0, 1) or (1, 0) can match with any man with
characteristics (0, 1) or (1, 0). This leads to indeterminacy of the joint distribution of (X,Y ) in the
matched population. In particular, for any c ∈ [0, 1], all joint distribution FX,Y described by the
following probability mass function are consistent with Assumption 1:
fX,Y (x, y) =

0.25 + 0.25c (x, y) = (1, 1)
0.25(1− c) (x, y) = (1, 0)
0.25(1− c) (x, y) = (0, 1)
0.25 + 0.25c (x, y) = (0, 0)
(3)
(b) We prove part (b) by giving another counter example, where (X,Y, , η) are all mutually
independent standard normal random variables, and the index functions are additive: U = X + ,
and V = Y + η. In this case, an assortative matching will match men and women according to the
equality
X +  = Y + η. (4)
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This implies a continuum of joint distributions for (X,Y ). For instance, Eq. (4) is consistent with
the matching
{(X,Y, , η) : X = η, Y = }
in which case (X,Y ) ∼ N(0, I2). It is also consistent with the matching
{(X,Y, , η) : X = Y, η = }
(X,Y ) ∼ N(0, [1, 1; 1, 1]). In fact, it is consistent with anything between these polar examples as
well.
As we can see from the examples, the key to the indeterminacy of F ∗X,Y is that different combi-
nations of X and  can yield the same value of U ≡ f(X, , βS), and different combinations of Y and
η can yield the same value of V ≡ g(Y, η, βS).3 In other words, a man with U = u is indifferent to
women with the same V = F−1V (FU (u, β, βS), βη, βS) but different combinations of (Y, η); and vice
versa. Under the index assumptions, any man (woman) will be indifferent between all matching
partners with a given index value, regardless of the particular values of Y (X) and  (η).
Formally, the indeterminacy problem can be described in the following way. The single index
assortative matching assumption implies a unique joint distribution of (U, V ), given by the Frechet
upper-bound copula4
FU,V (u, v, θ) = min(FU (u;β, βS), FV (v;βη, βS)). (5)
Also, the joint distribution of (U, V ) is related to that of (X,Y ) through the following integral
equation:
F ∗X,Y (x, y, θ) = FY (y)
∫ [∫
FX,|Y,η(x, e|y, a)de
]
dFη(a). (6)
Equation (5) uniquely determines Ff(X,,βS)|g(Y,η,βS)(u|v) but that is not sufficient to uniquely de-
termine the matched FX,|Y,η(x, e|y, a), causing F ∗X,Y (x, y, θ) to be underdetermined.
3As such, the fact that  and η are unobserved has nothing to do with the underlying indeterminacy problem.
Even if  and η were observed by the researcher, the index structure of the problem still causes the joint distribution
of (X,Y ) indeterminate in equilibrium.
4This is the joint distribution of (U, V ) having marginal distributions FU and FV with maximal positive correlation
between U and V ; see, eg., Joe (1997).
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Indeed, the single index assumption lies behind this indeterminacy feature: in the index func-
tion, many combinations of (X, ) – the “matching set”, as it is called in the literature5 – lead to
the same value of U (and analogously for V ), necessarily implying a one-to-many mapping from
FU,V to FX,Y . This problem cannot be resolved with only shape restrictions on the index functions
or the marginal distributions of  and η.
The indeterminacy problem pointed out in the previous section makes standard parametric
estimation of this model difficult. In particular, a typical approach to estimation would be to find
a value of the parameter vector θ to satisfy the following system of equations, which equate the
equilibrium distribution of (X,Y ), depending on unknown parameters (θ), to the distribution of
(X,Y ) observed by the researcher:
FX,Y (x, y) = F
∗
X,Y (x, y, θ), ∀x, y. (7)
This system of equations, linking observed to unobserved elements, fully summarizes the empirical
content of the model and can be used to estimate the the parameter of interest, θ, if the joint
distribution FX,Y (x, y) can be estimated from the data. However, as we pointed out in the previ-
ous section, the equilibrium distribution of (X,Y ), F ∗X,Y (·, ·, θ), may not be uniquely determined,
which makes this system of equations ill-defined. Similarly, maximum likelihood estimation of the
parameters θ also is precluded by the indeterminacy of FX,Y (·, ·; θ).
Relatedly, the indeterminancy of joint distribution of observable characteristics can prevent
point identification of the model parameters. To see this, consider a binary Bernoulli example
where the index functions are U = X+  and V = Y +η. X and Y are independent Bernoulli(0.5),
and  and η are independent Bernoulli(θ). The equilibrium matching in this setting is assortative
in the indices, and characterized by Eq. (2) above. If we assume in addition that people only match
with those who have the exactly the same characteristics with themselves, the joint distirbution
of (X,Y ) would be a pair of perfectly correlated Bernoulli(0.5) random variables. This joint
distribution is consistent with any θ ∈ [0, 1], so that θ is not point identified.
5See e.g. Shimer and Smith (2000), Atakan (2006).
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3 Resolving Indeterminacy via Random Matching
We propose one resolution of the indeterminacy problem using the notion of “random matching”.
Roughly, random matching means that agents with non-singleton matching sets have an equal
chance of being matched to any element of their matching sets. Formally, this is specified in the
following assumption:6
Assumption 2 (Random Matching). The joint distribution of (X, , Y, η) for a married couple
satisfies
FX,ε|Y,η(x|y, a) = FX,ε|g(Y,η)(x, e|g(y, a)), and FY,η|X,ε(y, a|x, e) = FY,η|f(X,ε)(y, a|f(x, e)).
That is, two women (men) with respectively characteristics (y, a) and (y′, a′) ((x, e) and (x′, e′)),
such that g(y, a) = g(y′, a′) (f(x, e) = f(x′, e′)), have equal opportunities among men (women).
Comments. (a) This assumption only requires the matches to occur randomly among potential
matches with the same surplus. Thus, the randomness does not affect the optimality of the matching
outcome.
(b) Assumption 2 may be micro-founded as limit versions of the search and matching models
of (i) Shimer and Smith (2000), as we take the agents’ patience to infinity; or (ii) Atakan (2006),
as the agents’ search cost approaches zero. Indeed, the random arrival of potential partners in
those search models provides a natural randomization mechanism, and the ex ante symmetry of
the agents guarantees the “equal opportunity” part of the assumption.
(c) In the Bernoulli example in the proof of Theorem 1(a), this assumption is equivalent to
imposing c = 0.5. 
The following theorem shows that random matching resolves the indeterminancy problem.
Theorem 2. Assumptions 1 and 2 together imply a unique joint distribution of X and Y in
married couples: F ∗X,Y (x, y).
Proof. Let the asterisk superscription denote the distribution function that involves variables from
both sides of the market, which could potentially be undetermined without the random matching
6In the assumption and the rest of this section, we ignore the parameter θ for notational simplicity.
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assumption. Under Assumption 2, the equilibrium matching can be defined by the following two
conditions:
(i) FU,V (u, v) = min{FU (u), FV (v)}; and
(ii) FX|Y,η(x|y, a) = FX|g(Y,η)(x|g(y, a)) and FY |X,ε(y|x, e) = FY |f(X,ε)(y|f(x, e)).
For any (y, a, x, e) such that FU (f(x, e)) > 0 and FV (g(y, a)) > 0, consider the derivation:
FY,η,X,ε(y, a, x, e) = FY,η|X,ε(y, a|x, e)FX,ε(x, e)
= FY,η|U (y, a|f(x, e))FX,ε(x, e)
= FY,η,U (y, a, f(x, e))
FX,ε(x, e)
FU (f(x, e))
= FU |Y,η(f(x, e)|y, a)FY,η(y, a)
FX,ε(x, e)
FU (f(x, e))
= FU |V (f(x, e)|g(y, a))FY,η(y, a)
FX,ε(x, e)
FU (f(x, e))
= FU,V (f(x, e), g(y, a))
FY,η(y, a)
FV (g(y, a))
FX,ε(x, e)
FU (f(x, e))
= min{FU (f(x, e)), FV (g(y, a))} FY,η(y, a)
FV (g(y, a))
FX,ε(x, e)
FU (f(x, e))
, (8)
where the first, third, fourth, and sixth equalities hold by the Bayes rule, the second and the fifth
equalities hold by (ii), and the last equality holds by (i). The expression in the last line of the above
display is fully and uniquely determined by the bivariate distribution functions FX,ε and FY,η. Thus,
the joint distribution of FY,η,X,ε is uniquely determined by those bivariate distributions. Finally,
the theorem is proved by noting that the matched joint distribution F ∗X,Y can be obtained by
F ∗X,Y (x, y) =
∫ ∫
FY,η,X,ε(y, a, x, e)dade. (9)
Next we illustrate Theorem 2 in the Bernoulli and the Standard Normal examples described in
the proof of Theorem 1 above.
Bernoulli Example, continued. In this example, random matching implies that the (1, 0)
and (0, 1) women match “randomly” with the (1, 0) and (0, 1) men. Formally, under Assumption
2, the matched joint distribution of (X, , Y, η) satisfies
(i) Pr(U = V ) = 1 (assortative matching and identical distribution of U and V ); and
(ii) Pr(X = 1|Y = y, η = a) = Pr(X = 1|Y + η = y + a) (random matching)
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The two conditions uniquely determine the joint distribution of X and Y in the matched pop-
ulation by the following derivation. First observe that
Pr(X = 1|Y = 1, η = 1) = Pr(X = 1|V = 2) = Pr(X = 1|U = 2)
= Pr(X = 1|X = 1,  = 1) = 1 (10)
where the first equality holds by condition (ii) and the second equality holds by condition (i).
Similarly,
Pr(X = 1|Y = 0, η = 0) = Pr(X = 1|V = 0) = Pr(X = 1|U = 0)
= Pr(X = 1|X = 0,  = 0) = 0 (11)
Pr(X = 1|Y = 1− η) = Pr(X = 1|V = 1) = Pr(X = 1|U = 1)
= Pr(X = 1|X = 1,  = 0 or X = 0,  = 1) = 0.5 (12)
(13)
Therefore,
Pr(X = 1|Y = 1) = 0.5 Pr(X = 1|Y = 1, η = 1) + 0.5 Pr(X = 1|Y = 1, η = 0) = 0.75
Pr(X = 1|Y = 0) = 0.5 Pr(X = 0|Y = 0, η = 1) + 0.5 Pr(X = 1|Y = 0, η = 0) = 0.25 (14)
These fully and uniquely characterize the joint distribution of X and Y . 
Bivariate normal example, continued. For the bivariate normal example, under Assump-
tion 2, the matched joint distribution of (X, , Y, η) satisfies
(i) Pr(U = V ) = 1; and
(ii) fX|Y,η(x|y, a) = fX|Y+η(x|y + a).
Now we show that in the optimal match defined by (i) and (ii), the unique distribution of
observed characteristics (X,Y ) is mean-zero bivariate normal with variance covariance matrix
[1, 0.5; 0.5, 1]. Observe that
fX|Y,η(x|y, a) = fX|Y+η(x|y + a) = fX|X+(x|y + a)
= fX,X+(x, y + a)/fX+(y + a)
=
(2pi)−1 exp(−2−1(2x2 − 2x(y + a) + (y + a)2))
(4pi)−1/2 exp(−4−1(y + a)2)
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= pi−1/2 exp(−x2 + xy + xa− (y + a)2/4), (15)
where the second equality holds with probability one by condition (i). Thus,
fX|Y (x|y) =
∫ ∞
−∞
fX|Y,η(x|y, a)fη(a)da
=
∫ ∞
−∞
pi−1/2 exp(−x2 + xy + xa− (y + a)2/4)(2pi)−1/2 exp(−a2/2)da
=
1√
2pi
exp(−x2 + xy − y2/4)
∫ ∞
−∞
exp(xe− ya/2− 3a2/4)da, (16)
where the first equality holds due to the independence of Y and η. Therefore,
fX,Y (x, y) = fX|Y (x|y)fY (y)
=
1
2pi3/2
exp(−x2 + xy − 3y2/4)
∫ ∞
−∞
exp(xa− ya/2− 3a2/4)de
=
1√
3pi
exp(−(x, y)Σ−1(x, y)′/2), (17)
where Σ = [1, 0.5; 0.5, 1]. This shows that (X,Y ) ∼ N(0,Σ). 
3.1 Estimation strategies
After establishing the uniqueness of FX,Y (·, ·; θ), either a simulated likelihood or a simulated method
of moments approach can be used to estimate the model parameter θ. The F ∗X,Y (·, ·, θ) function,
which often does not have closed form solution, can be simulated via the following steps.
Step 1. Independently drawN i.i.d. observations of (X, ) and (Y, η) from FX,(·, ·, β) and FY,η(·, ·, βη)
respectively for a large number N . Denote the draws by {Xi, i}Ni=1 and {Yi, ηi}Ni=1.
Step 2. Compute {Ui = f(Xi, i, βS)}Ni=1 and {Vi = g(Yi, ηi, βS)}Ni=1.
Step 3. Sort both {(Xi, Ui)} and {(Yi, Vi)} in decreasing order of Ui and Vi respectively. Ensure that
ties (if any) are sorted randomly. Let the sorted data be denoted {X˜i, ˜i, Y˜i, η˜i}Ni=1.
Step 4. Then, compute the simulated F ∗X,Y (x, y; θ) as follows:
F ∗X,Y (x, y; θ) = N
−1
N∑
i=1
1(X˜i ≤ x, Y˜i ≤ y). (18)
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Both simulated maximum likelihood and simulated method of moments are well-studied estimation
procedures in the econometrics literature.7 The asymptotic properties of the resulting estimators
are standard and well known, and thus we omit such discussions in this note.
4 Simulation and Empirical Application
In this section we consider a set of Monte Carlo simulations, followed by an empirical application
using census data from China. We specify g and f as follows:
f(X, ) = X ′, g(Y, η) = Y ′η, (19)
where X is a dx vector of observables for women, and Y is a dy vector of observables for men, and
 and η are respectively the random weights of those observables in the utility indices for women
and men.
We carry out both Monte Carlo and empirical application using simulated GMM. Potentially
there are infinite number of moment conditions to use because E[1(X ≤ x, Y ≤ y)] = F ∗X,Y (x, y, θ)
needs to hold at all points of (x, y). For implementation, we use a finite number of grid points on
(x, y) and use two-step GMM to estimate θ, where the procedure in Section 3.1 is used to simulate
the equilibrium matching for each candidate parameter vector θ.
4.1 Monte Carlo
For our Monte Carlo exercise, we consider three different models. For all three, we let X = [X1, X2]
′,
where X1 ∼ N(0, 1) and X2 is drawn drom {−1, 0, 1} with equal probability. Similarly, let Y =
[Y1, Y2]
′, where Y1 ∼ N(1, 1) and Y2 is drawn from {0, 1, 2, 3} with equal probability. We also let
all random variables be independently drawn.
Model 1 Consider a simplest model with ε and η being non-random. Normalize the first entries of ε
and η to one, with ε = [ε1, ε2]
′ = [1, 2]′ and η = [η1, η2]′ = [1, 0.5]′. Therefore, our parameter
of interest in the model is θ0 = (ε2, η2) = (2, 0.5).
Model 2 We add randomness in this model while keeping the first entries of ε and η constant. Let
Model 2 be exactly like Model 1 except that ε2 ∼ N(µε, σ2ε) and η2 ∼ N(µη, σ2η). Let our
parameter of interest be θ0 = (µ, σ
2
ε , µη, σ
2
η) = (2, 0.5, 0.5, 1).
7See Gourieroux and Montfort (1997), for example.
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Model 3 ε1 and η1 are also random, but the distribution is normalized to be N(1, 1). Therefore, our
parameter of interest is still θ0 = (µ, σ
2
ε , µη, σ
2
η) = (2, 0.5, 0.5, 1).
We draw a sample size of 10,000 and set number of simulations for simulated moments as
1,000,000. We report our results in Table 1. For comparison, we also report the result of the
canonical correlation method of Dupuy and Galichon (2012). They showed that the canonical
correlation method is consistent in Model 1 where there is no random coefficient and X and Y
are normal. For optimization, we use the simulated annealing method and report both the results
using the true value as starting value (SA-True) and using a randomly generated starting value
(SA-Random).8
Table 1: Simulated Bias and Variance of Parameter Estimators
Canonical Correlation SA-True SA-Random
Model 1 Bias Var Bias Var Bias Var
ε2 −0.1565 0.0001 0.0262 0.0670 0.0015 0.0009
η2 0.0065 0.0000 0.0019 0.0000 0.0003 0.0000
Model 2
µε 0.3388 0.0073 0.0027 0.0040 0.0045 0.0041
σ2ε − − 0.0079 0.0072 0.0128 0.0078
µη −0.0739 0.0003 −0.0036 0.0009 −0.0048 0.0009
σ2η − − 0.0368 0.0047 0.0343 0.0046
Model 3
µε 0.5225 0.0248 0.0171 0.0187 0.0200 0.0199
σ2ε − − 0.0606 0.0489 0.0721 0.0537
µη 0.0255 0.0008 0.0330 0.0026 0.0310 0.0028
σ2η − − 0.0359 0.0301 0.0284 0.0315
As we can see, our method outperforms the canonical correlation method in estimating the
means of the random coefficients in all three models (with µη in Model 3 as an exception).
9
8We also tried Nelder-Mead, but the performance is poor because it tends to get stuck in local minima.
9In a sense, this is not a fair comparison because the canonical correlation method is not shown to be consistent
when the coefficients are random or when the covariates are non-normal.
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4.2 Empirical Application
In this subsection, we report an empirical application using the 0.95% sample of the Chinese 2000
census. We consider age and years of education as conditioning covariates, and examine how they
affect the marriage matching function over time. Both age and years of education are continuous
random variables. We divide the data according to the year when a couple got married, to see
whether the matching function has changed over time. For the age variable, we use either the age
of the agent in 2000 (“current age”), or the age when he or she got married (“marriage age”). Since
differences in the marriage distribution according to marriage vs. current age arise from marriage
dissolution, through either divorce/separation or (less likely) death, the difference in the results
may shed light on the nature of divorce costs, an avenue which we do not pursue here.
Table 2 gives the empirical results. The matching functions follow the form in (19). The
variables X and Y are both two-dimensional, where the first dimension stands for years of schooling
and the second is either current age or marriage age. The model we used is Model 2 described
in the Monte Carlo subsection above.10 For both models, the parameters of interest are θ0 =
(µ, σ
2
ε , µη, σ
2
η). Since X
′ represents the quality index of a man, which is identically perceived
by all women, we can interpret  as the idiosyncratic “weight” that a man’s education has in his
quality index. Thus µ represents the average weight of education, and σ is the variation in this
across all men. An analogous interpretation applies to the women’s parameters µη and ση.
There are 256,663 couples that we are able to track both the marriage age and the current age
in the data. We divided observations into six groups according to when they got married, and
treated each group as one marriage market. We also provide estimates for the whole population to
use as a benchmark (also visualized by horizontal dashed lines in Figure 1).
As shown in Table 2 as well as Figure 1, results by using current age and by marriage are
qualitatively similar, so we focus on interpreting the estimates obtained by using marriage age.
The estimates for µ (or µη) can be interpreted as the average ratio of importance of age and
education in marriage market. For example, before 1951, one year of education is on average as
valuable as being roughly a half-year (0.4532) older for men. We observe that the estimated average
education weight for women (µη) has a sharp fall in the 1980s, while the parameter for men (µ)
10We also estimated Model 3, although the result is harder to interpret because of the different way of normalization.
The results are available upon request.
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Table 2: Empirical Results
before 1951 1951-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 Overall
current age
µε 0.3565 0.3783 0.6995 0.4098 0.2307 0.5268 0.6727
σ2ε 2.1416 0.5160 0.2174 0.1069 0.0538 0.1373 0.0008
µη 0.2410 0.4150 0.6462 0.5490 0.7648 1.0870 0.8291
σ2η 1.1602 0.4227 0.0990 0.1067 0.0742 0.0089 0.0016
marriage age
µε 0.4532 0.8132 1.0389 0.9786 0.4126 0.7083 1.0153
σ2ε 1.6218 1.8299 0.0678 0.3301 0.0713 0.0002 0.2145
µη 0.4691 0.7212 0.9345 1.0918 1.2501 1.9554 1.4277
σ2η 1.2532 0.7660 0.4138 0.0809 0.1671 0.4050 0.1476
Observations 6683 17513 35531 55949 87611 53376 256663
exhibits a steady upward trend. These trends are plotted in Figure 1.
One possible explanation for these trends, which is consistent with some discussions in the
public press, is that this finding represents some long-term impact of the infamous Cultural Rev-
olution (1966-76) in China, in which education was de-emphasized and educated urban “elites”
were demonized and exiled to the countryside. Those who became of marriageable age in the 1980s
were exactly those who grew up during the cultural revolution. Nevertheless, this is only a partial
explanation, as our results suggest that the value of education fell only for women but not for men.
We will investigate these effects further in future research.
However, the above discussion is based on an assumption that people’s valuation towards age, or
the importance of age in the marriage market, is relatively stable across time, because we normalize
the weight of age in our model to be one. Becuase of this normalization, another valid interpretation
of the increase in the valuation of men’s education is that a man’s age has become less important
over time.
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Figure 1: Evolution of effect of education on marriage market relative to effect of age
5 Concluding remark
In this note, we have focused throughout on uniqueness of the joint distribution of (X,Y ), as
it makes standard parametric methods for point estimates of the model parameters (β, βη, θ)
(via MLE or method of moments) feasible. It may be possible to (partially) estimate the model
parameters using incomplete model approaches. We do not investigate that possibility here because
it is not clear how to generate estimating equalities or inequalities in our setup; furthermore, there
are also computational and inferential difficulties which are beyond the scope of this short note.
Rather, we focus on resolving the indeterminacy issue via the additional assumption of random
matching – which may be quite realistic in a real-world marriage application as it is justified by
search-theoretic arguments.
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